I show that in a multidimensional spatial model, if an agent is risk neutral on each side of the policy space away from her ideal point, then her utility function is linearly decreasing in the city block distance to the ideal policy of the agent.
the agent is said to be risk neutral over policies that all lie to the same side of her ideal point (see Berinsky and Lewis [2] ). However, this interpretation is correct only if the space is unidimensional. With multiple dimensions, the shape of the indifference curves affects the risk attitude of the agent.
I adapt the definition of risk neutrality to political applications with satiated preferences over multiple issues. I show that the utility function of risk neutral agents must be linearly decreasing in the city block distance to the ideal point of the agent. Consider a fair lottery between (0, 0) and (2, 0). Its expected value is (1, 0). The expected utility of the lottery is
(−2) = −1 which is equal to the utility of the expected value, so the agent is risk neutral for this particular lottery according to either utility function.
Suppose instead that y = 1, and consider the fair lottery between (0, 1) and (2, 1), with expected value (1, 1). According to the linear Euclidean utility, u(1, 1) = − √ 2 ≈ −1.41, and the expected utility of the lottery is u(2, 1) = −1.62, so the agent is risk averse.
This result generalizes: Fixing any value y 6 = 0, for any lottery over x, an agent with linear 2 I assume that the spatial representation of the set of feasible policies is exogenously given. If alternatives are not quantifiable, the mapping from the set of alternatives to R K is endogenous and any notion of risk attitudes based on the shape of the utility functions becomes problematic. See Kalandrakis [8] , Bogomolnaia and Laslier [3] and Eguia [4] for spatial models with an endogenous representation of the set of alternatives. 
Theory
Let X = R K be a set of alternatives. 3 Each of the K dimension corresponds to a policy issue, and an alternative is a policy bundle that specifies a policy for each issue. Let ∆X be the set of all simple lotteries defined over X. 4 For any given lottery p ∈ ∆X, let p(x) denote the probability that p assigns to x ∈ X. Slightly abusing notation, let x, y, z, w ∈ X also denote degenerate lotteries, 5 so they belong to ∆X. Let x k denote the k-th coordinate of 3 The result generalizes to X ⊂ R K with an open interior. The proof is available from the author. 4 A simple lottery is one that assigns positive probability only to a finite number of outcomes. 5 Degenerate lotteries are those that generate a specific outcome with probability 1.
x and let x −k denote the vector of K − 1 dimensions that contains all the coordinates of x except x k . Then one can write x as x = (x k , x −k ).
Let % be a complete and transitive binary relation on ∆X representing the weak preferences of agent i over lotteries on X. Let x Â y denote (x % y, not y % x) and let x ∼ y denote (x % y, y % x). Let % be representable by the expected utility of a Von Neuman and Morgenstern [13] utility function u : X −→ R such that for any p, q ∈ ∆X, p % q if and
Assume that % has a unique maximal element x * ∈ X such that x * Â p for any p ∈ ∆X,
The degenerate lottery x * is the most preferred alternative of the agent. Without loss of generality, let x * = (0, ..., 0). The set X is divided into 2 K orthants. Each orthant is one of the subsets composed of the points that do not contain both points that are strictly positive and points that are strictly negative in any given dimension; the analog of a quadrant on R 2 or an octant on R 3 . Let O j denote an arbitrary one of them, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 2 K } An agent is risk neutral if for any p ∈ ∆X , p ∼ X x∈X p(x)x that is, if she is indifferent between the lottery p and its expected value Consider the orthant that is non-positive in all dimensions. Within that orthant, the agent wants more of everything. This is the standard economic environment. Hence the standard risk neutrality concept applies, within this orthant. A risk neutral agent is indifferent between a lottery that assigns positive probability to outcomes in this orthant and its expected value. I impose the same condition within any other orthant: A risk neutral agent is indifferent between any lottery that assigns positive probability to outcomes in only one orthant and the expected value of this lottery.
x for any p whose support is contained in a single orthant. If preferences over lotteries satisfy orthant risk neutrality, then the preferences over sure outcomes can be represented by a utility function that is linear in the distance measured by a generalization of the city block norm. To state the result formally, I first define the generalized weighted city block distance. 
The standard city block norm has equal weights in every dimension, and on each side of the origin, that is, λ k+ = λ k− = λ j+ = λ j− for any j, k ∈ {1, ..., K}. A weighted city block Proof. Recall x * = {0} K and without loss of generality let u(0, ..., 0) = 0 and u(1, 0, ..., 0) = −1. For each k ∈ {2, ..., K}, let x k ∈ X be such that x k k = 1 and x k j = 0 for any j 6 = k, and
for all k and
The set Z is the set of points in the non-negative orthant that are a convex combination of points along each of the axes that yield utility −1. By orthant risk neutrality, u(z) = −1 for any z ∈ Z.
Let O 1 denote the non-negative orthant. Note that any y ∈ O 1 can be expressed as a linear transformation y = αz of some z ∈ Z for some α > 0. By orthant risk neutrality, it follows u(y) = αu(z) = −α.
therefore, u(y) = −d λ (y). The second equality follows from y = αz; the third from z ∈ Z;
the fourth from for any i ∈ {1, ..., K}, the weight on dimension i is constant for all orthants that are negative on dimension i.
As a corollary, if preferences are symmetric so that along each dimension utility loses are equal in each direction away from the origin, then the generalized weighted city block distance reduces to a standard weighted city block norm.
Discussion
In spatial models, the two most popular utility functions are linear and quadratic Euclidean (McCarty and Meirowitz [9] , p.22-24, p.80). The quadratic Euclidean utility function in multiple dimensions is the natural extension of the quadratic utility function in one dimension. However, the linear Euclidean utility function in multiple dimensions is not the natural extension of the linear utility in one dimension. In two dimensions, a linear Euclidean utility function is a cone. If we fix a non-zero value in the second dimension, and we cut the cone with a plane at that value, the resulting utility function in one dimension is not a linear function, but a hyperbola. The extension of linear utility to multiple dimensions is a linear city block utility function, whose shape in two dimensions is a pyramid, which, when cut by a plane, generates the linear utility function in one dimension.
An implication is that the popularity of linear Euclidean functions is inconsistent with the inattention to city block functions. If the appropriate assumption in one dimension is linearity, then the consistent choice is to use linear city block utilities in multiple dimensions.
Whether a linear city block or a quadratic Euclidean utility function is more appropriate depends on the risk attitude of the agent. If agents are risk neutral, then the linear city block utility is appropriate, and if so, the theoretical implications for the stability of majority rule in multiple dimensions are huge: While the core is generically empty if indifference curves are Euclidean (or more generally, smooth; Plott [10] ), core outcomes exist more generally if utilities are city block (Humphreys and Laver [7] ).
A recent article by Berinsky and Lewis [2] attempts to estimate the risk attitude of US voters. They assume that the utility function is decreasing in some power of the Euclidean distance in three dimensions, and they estimate the parameter α in the utility function Ã µ
, where w k is the weight of each issue. They estimate that α = 0.98, and they interpret this finding as risk neutrality. However, this interpretation is not correct. As I have shown, the risk attitude is not only determined by the loss function, it also depends on the shape of the indifference curves. Their estimation that α ≈ 1 implies that starting at their multidimensional ideal point, agents are risk neutral on any direction, but starting away from their ideal point, agents are risk averse along any direction.
To improve upon their results and obtain an estimate of risk aversion that is robust over the whole policy space, I suggest estimating α using the utility function
If agents are not very risk averse, then α is close to one, the indifference curves are approximately linear, and a linear city block utility function is a better assumption than quadratic Euclidean utilities.
Tomz and Van Houweling [12] conduct laboratory experiments to test the effect on voters of uncertainty about the policy platform espoused by a candidate. They find that "on average, ambiguity does not repel and may, in fact, attract voters." Their finding is consistent with risk neutrality. Empirical studies on voters' choices in presidential and legislative elections by Enelow, Mendell and Ramesh [5] , Westholm [14] and Grynaviski and Corrigan [6] obtain better results using city block utilities than using Euclidean utilities. These results provide more indirect evidence that a linear city block function may better represent the preferences of voters.
These findings are relevant for models of ideal point estimation. While they all use the Euclidean distance, using a linear city block utility may improve their results. Better yet, once we have a reliable estimate b α of risk aversion for the whole policy space, ideal point estimation methods will achieve the best results using the utility function u i (x) =
